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Army Objective Force 


"A force projection 
Army that is decisive 


across the 
full spectrum 
of conflict in tl 
2 1 s lGmtu ry" 

US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

09 April 2001 



Agenda 


• Decisiveness 

• Illustrative Scenario: 

Operational Environment 
^National Command Authority (NCA) 
Guidance 
Military Objectives 

• Objective Force in future scenario: 

^Entry Operations 
^Decisive Operations 

• Pursuit of Technology 

• Summary 



Purpose 


Illustrate: 

•Objective Force - essential to 
executing decisive Joint operations 

•Challenges of emerging operational 
environments 

• Significance of Army support to the 
CINC 

•Key operational capabilities of the 
Objective Force 



Define " DECISIVENESS " 


•Ability to accomplish strategic goals and 
objectives 

•Decision is achieved by: 

^The ability to force an enemy to succumb 
to our will and cease to resist 
Physically destroying enemy's capability 
to fight 

Breaking enemy's will by: 

> Inflicting more destruction and 
disintegration of control than the enemy 
can bear 

> Forcing capitulation to negotiate 
settlement 



What Constitutes 

DCCiSiVGnGSS 

•Operations other than war 

Solidify partnerships / relationships 
^ Enforce peace 
^ Prevent crisis 

•Smaller Scale Conflict / Crisis (SSC) 

Re-establish regional stability, lasting peace 
s Halt genocide, end refugee flow 
Eliminate threats to regimes 

• Major Theater War (MTW) 

Counter offensive to rapidly conclude conflict 

^ Significant reduction of risk to US / Allied forces 

Enable rapid swing between theaters if second 
conflict erupts 



How Force Projection Army 
Brings Closure to Joint 
Operations 

•Supports CINC by establishing multi-dimensional area 
of influence 

•Cements vital coalitions, helps stabilize governments 

• Directly attacks enemy anti-access strategy 

• Immediately alters crisis conditions 

Despite significant challenges of time sensitivity, 
anti-access and a complex environment... 

•Accomplishes decisive military action to achieve 
CINC / NCA stated objectives 

Bottom line: Closure is assured and rapid 



Illustrative 

Scenario 

( 2010 ) 



• Azerbaijan: Pro-Western President; Opposed by 
radical Islamic dissident faction supported by Iran 



Iran providing military support to Armenia to 
increase pressure on Azerbaijani government 

Armenia invades Azerbaijan to regain lost 
territory 

Islamic dissident faction demands resignation of 
Azerbaijani president 

Iran positions substantial military forces along the 
Azerbaijani border; postured towards Baku 

Russia proposes a joint US / Russian operation to 
halt Armenian aggression, restore previous 
border, and deter Iranian intervention in the crisis 



Operational Environment 



NATO expansion in region 
Tension between Russia and 
Tu rkey 

Instability in Former Soviet 
Union states 

Religious/Ethnic fault lines 
Aggressive China 
Simmering India / Pakistan 
situation 

Islamic Fundamentalism 

International 
terrorist groups 
International 
corporate business 
Religious groups 
Nomadic non- 
aligned groups 


Operational Environment 



Failed states 

Ethnic hatred and genocide 
Imbalance of economic power 
and resource distribution 
Disillusioned emerging 
democracies 
Growing disenfranchised 
factions 

Increased internal criminal 


Proliferation 

of 

Conventional 
& Weapons of 


LL ,> h I r • liU ■ 

■u.i ' J . 

L ! 1 h^ |J : 


Fundamental! 

st 

Movements 


Terrorist & 
Insurgent 
Activity 


All Factors Localized in the Caspian 

Reaion 


US Strategic Interests 
in Caspian Region 
2010 

• Increased US & allied access / influence to 

Stabilize region 

Preclude failed states / open hostilities along 
tribal, ethnic, & religious lines 

^ Ensure balance of power in region 

Promote good governance, free market 
economics, basic human rights 

s Promote adherence to rule of international law 

• Preclude conflict escalation to hostilities 

• US investment in energy resources 



Potential Crises On Many 
Fronts: 



Amrit^r 


Turke 


China 


Regional 
actors take 
steps to wield 
influence in 
Caspian 
region 

External 
states drawn 
into ootential 


India 





Conflict Patterns 



•Mechanized and Armored units, 
supported by artillery and rocket 
attack rapidly from multiple 


Long Range - High Altitude 
sophisticated Air Defense 
systems are dispersed and 
deployed in Armenia, 

ran 




GPS and 
Electronic 
jammers 
deployed 


I 1 1 






Conflict Patterns 



•Special Purpose Forces target 
and take direct action against 
reserves, communications and 


airfields 




Infantry and Engineers 
establish ambush sites 
in complex terrain 


SCUDs and Cruise Missiles 
are dispersed and 
camouflaged prepared to 
strike APODS and SPODS 




Conflict Patterns 


•Azeri refugees and POWs 
are positioned in camps 
around dispersed artillery 
and MRL batteries 



•Local citizens are organized to report 
enemy troop movements and 

•Armenian refugees 

in Turkey are 

encouraged 

to sabotage air 
•Air Assault Infant^ggyerrilfas, 

positioned to strike supply lines and 






Conflict Patterns 



•Iran positions MRL and 
long range artillery 
along the border. 


MANPADs, RPGs, mortars and 
explosives are smuggled to Islamic 

diML: | r a n i a n television and 

radio station conduct 
Information Operations. 

• Iran positions submarines in the 
Black Sea and along the 
Dardanelles 









Insurgent Areas 

•Incite Riots ‘Sniper* 

• Raids 
‘Ambushes 
•Terrorism 

• Reconnaissance 


Caspian 


400 km 








Challenge: Strengthening 
the Government of 
Azerbaijan 

•Weakened Azerbaijani government in 
danger of collapse. If Azerbaijani 
government collapses... 

^Externally supported (Iran) radical 
Islamic faction will form new hostile 
government 

^Terrorism, civil unrest and civil war 

s Insurgents will attempt to control 
populace through mass media (radio, 
TV, papers); 10 campaign 



Challenge: Supporting 
the 

Azerbaijani military 

•Azerbaijani military rapidly losing its 
fight with Armenian forces 

s Azeri Military Forces require 
reinforcement or support to remain 
cohesive 

•Armenia capable of conducting 
operations to limit, interrupt and deny 
access 

^Equipped with cruise missiles, SCUD 
ballistic missiles and long range 
precision multiple rocket launchers 



Challenge: Decisive 

■ I ^VIUJIVII 

•Iranian forces are postured near the 
Azerbaijani border 

Significant conventional ground 
forces: (3 Mechanized Divisions, 
and 2 Armored Divisions) 

s Sufficient strength to rapidly 
overwhelm Azeri forces and occupy 
Baku 

Supported by ballistic missile and 
sophisticated air defense forces 



National 

Command 

Authority 


★ ★★★★★ 

*********** 

*********** 
★ ★ ★ ★ ★ 

★ ★★★★★ 
★ ★ ★ ★ ★ 
★ ★★★★★ 



GClidcft USJjorce to separate belligerents 

• Preclude intervention by regional aggressor militaries 

• Expel invading forces 

• Reestablish legitimate international boundaries 

• Establish conditions for negotiated settlement and 
long-term International Observer Force 

• Safeguard US force and interests in theater 


Within Four Weeks: Stop continued aggression, and 
secure border areas 

Within Eight - Twelve Weeks: Expel invading forces, 

re-establish legitimate international border, and 
prepare 

to defeat aggression by any regional military forces 






Bak 


Control 
Insurge 
nt Areas 


Deter 


Iran 


km 


400 


Caspian 

Sea 


Secure 

Oil 

fields 


Bolster 

Azerbaijani 

Military 


Halt 

Armenian 

Advance 


Turke 

y 


Suppo 

rt 

Azeri 

Gov't 






CINC Military Objectives 


• Stabilize Azerbaijani government, force 
insurgents out of capital city, quell 
unrest 

• Deter or defeat Iranian forces. Prevent 
illegitimate occupation 

• Halt Armenian forces 

• Restore Azerbaijan / Armenia border 

• Establish and maintain coalition 




CINC Intent 


• Show US commitment from the outset 

• Immediately engage the near term threat to Azeri 
sovereignty, which is the invading Armenian force 

• Deter Iranian intervention by first demonstrating 
commitment to engage all forces that threaten an 
attack on Azerbaijan, its forces or people 

• Support Azeri counter insurgency operations with 
inte , log, psychological and information 
operations, legal and police support 

• Stabilize, then attack to destroy if Armenian 
forces won't leave Azeri soil 

• Demonstrate intent by directing powerful strikes 
at key Armenian centers of gravity 



Centers of Gravity 

IVVVJ/ 

• Azerbaijani government: Primary COG , 
time sensitive* 

• Forward positioned Iranian forces: Time 
sensitive* 

• Armenian military forces: Time 
sensitive* 

• Successful action against these 
COCs establishes the conditions that 
enable the following actions: 

^End Azerbaijan - Armenia hostilities 


./ri.- i ■ i : 


i i i 


Army Objectives 


•Stabilize Azerbaijani Government 

•Form multi-national coalition 

•Halt Armenian advance 

• Eject Armenian forces 

•Deter Iranian aggression 

•Restore stability in Azerbaijan 

•Be prepared to evacuate non- 
combatants 



Problems in Foreseeable 

Future 

Lack of Theater 
Infrastructure 

D/stdJScteir & Naval Power cannot stop aggression 
in time 

•No US Ground Forces forward deployed in 
theater. Have to deploy from: 

^ CONUS 

^ Central Europe 

•Lack of mature infrastructure complicates 
access and sustainment 

•The Joint Force can't get there from here... 
limited lift, air and sea ports, time sensitive 


US Forces 

Available 

Time 



To do this 


Army forces have to be light enough to deploy rapidly, but mobile and lethal 
enough to be decisive 

Forces will have to fight in different ways: 

s Flexible doctrine 

s Overmatching combat power from S & T 

s Smaller but more capable, agile and versatile organizations against the most 
advanced threats 

s Adaptive and adept leaders 
s Innovative, professional soldiers 
s Joint / Army integrated C4ISR as key enabler 




Implication for the National Military 

Cf Am# 


To achieve strategic success in the future, the Service 
and the Joint Force must apply different metrics to the 
force effectiveness equation. 


The Objective Force is 
therefore centered on: 


Changing the paradigms of Responsiveness, Deployability, Vt 
Agility, Survivability, Lethality, Sustainment - So that the Natio 
the Joint Force Commander will have... 

"A Force Projection Army that is decisive across the full spectrum of 
warfare in the 21st Century" 


Assess Army Today / 
Tomorrow Aqainst CONOPS 




Challenges 


Time 

Environment 

Threat 

Friendly Forces 


Concepts 


Define 


Failure at any critical task results 
in failure to meet NCA and CINC guidance 

Assessing Today's Force 
Against Future Dilemmas 

* Power Projection 

* Assured Access 

* Entry Operations 

* Decisive Operations 

* Sustain 



30 


Dilemma - Power 

Projection 



Power Projection / Time 


Task / Purpose: Rapidly deploy land 
forces into AOR to respond to crisis in 


C91ft©ri*9*-esolve with 
immediate credible 
presence on the ground 
•Stabilize Azerbaijan 
government 
•Secure population, oil 
fields and entry points for 
follow-on forces 
•Establish Coalition Task 
Force 

•Support CINC strategy to 
deter Iranian aggression 


■,^kr Georgia \ 

& # Ok 

\o <# 

Armenia AzeraPjas^ 

o^o! / 


Turkey 


<> 


o 



Challenges to Power 
Projection 


• Time sensitivity 

• Environment: 


Size of AOR, imposing geography, weather extremes 

Diverse terrain - combination of open / rolling, 
urban, close and complex, mountainous 

Austere infrastructure - class 40 roads and bridges, 
few developed air and sea ports, few options for 
combat service support 

Limited host nation support - fuel, water, food 



Challenges to Power 
Projection 

• Four simultaneous enemy problems: 

^ Regional anti-access strategy 

In WEST, Armenian aggression (230km from 
Baku) 

s In SOUTH, Iran postured to invade (180 km from 
Baku) 

^ At Baku, insurgent role is overthrow the 
government, invoke terror amongst population or 
damage the oil fields 

• Coalition / Alliance: 

Azeri military is struggling to halt Armenian 
attacks 

Azerbaijan government on verge of collapse 
Alliance vital interests not clearly threatened 



Power Projection Concept - 


Today 


TODAY 


strategic Lines of 
Communication 
(LOCs) 


^ Light DRB in 24-72 
hours 

Light force lacks 
lethality, mobility, 
survivability and 
staying power 
Initially, information 
only by sensors 
s Lin£ar4>attlespace 

taging base 



^ Army Divisions tied to LOCs 
^ Extensive force build-up 
required 

5-1/3 Divisions deploy in over 75 
days 

Requires large staging bases 
Counter offensive forces 



Require deep water ports < 
Army pre-positioned stock 


Power Projection Concept - 



CORE CAPABILITIES 




< 


Tactical aircraft with 
strategic legs to carry 
soldiers and equipment 

Speed by air and sea 

Not reliant on sea and air 
ports 

By-pass anti-access to 
unimproved strips 

Credible air-ground Task 
Force in 120 hours. Can 
fight upon arrival 

Lethal, mobile, survivable 
force 


Get in rapidly with 
credible combat power 
that can deal with 
challenges 




Self-sustaining for 3-7 
days, then establish 
staging bases to sustain 
the force 


Entry / decisive operations 
blur 


I nt I nn ictirc Hwo r fh< 



AIR 

PORT 


I AIR 
STRI 


S - Very Tailora 


BLACI 


SEA PORT 


Army Aviation self- 
deploys from Europe 
(1200nm) 


OBJ BDE 
IN 96 
HRS 


OBJ DIV 
IN 120 
HRS 


Today can't get 
5 divisions and 
2 corps in to do 
these things 


2 CORPS 
HQ 


5 DIV IN 
30 DAYS 


Turkey 


CASPIAN SEA 


SEA PORT 


Tailorable to needs of 

CINC 

Maneuver 
Maneuver support: 

s Recon, Surveillance, 
Target, Acquisition 
s Joint Precision Strike 
Counter insurgency 
Army Aviation (Recon, 
Attack, Lift) 
s Joint C3I 

Civil Affairs, MP Psyops 



How Objective Force Deters 

Objective: Impose will to deter aggression by Iran and 
stabilize region 

How: 

•Establish credible, multi-dimensional presence with a 
division in 120 hours and 5 divisions closing within 30 days 

•Get dominant maneuver capability on the ground early on 

•Aggressive reconnaissance, surveillance and target 
acquisition in depth integrated with joint sensor network 

•Neutralize enemy capability with precision strike 

•Wage information operations campaign to dissuade 
aggression 


See, understand and act first to neutralize 
enemy capabilities while signaling US 



^ Government stable 
s Coalition with 
Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Turkey 
s Non combatant 
evacuation ongoing 
^ Baku and oil fields 
secure 

s Sea and airports 
secure 

^ Initial Joint C3I 
Network in place 
^ Developing the 
situation % m 




39 


Dilemma - Assured 

Access 



Growing Anti-Access 



HAuGiiMG THREAT 


Zl aa NUKE/BIO/CHEM 


SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCE 
TERRORISTS 

5 MINES ^ B 


CRUISE MISSILES & UAV 
BALLISTIC MISSILES& 
ROCKETS 

SUBMARINES 


FIXED & ROTARY WING 

AIRCRAFT 

BLUE WATER NAVY 


TODAY 


2000 


Low 


2015 


HOW IT'S CHANGING 


Anti Access is becoming a 
significant Threat 


Emerging 
Capabilities 

NBC 

SPF / Terrorists 
TBM / Cruise / UAV 
Air and Missile Defenses 
Counter Precision & ISR 
Submarines and Mines 
Effective C4 & ISR 
Information Operations 


Maintain Threat of 
WME/D 

Missile and long range 
fires on airfields and 
ports 

Introduce SPF for 
intelligence and direct 
action against key 
facilities-airfields, ports 
and staging areas 

Threaten strikes 
against neighboring 
states for allowing 
access 

Leverage commercial 
world 


aracterized by Proliferation of Lower Cost Alternate 


Influence World 
Opinion 

Attack Alliance & 





Anti-Access 


Objective 


Threaten 
Neighbors for 
Allowing Access 


Deny Objective 
Force Entry at 
Airfields and Sea 
Ports 


Direct Action 

Against 

Facilities 


Gain Inf 


ormation on 
Deploying Forces 

Target and Disrupt 
Forces - y 

Target and Destroy 
Facilities 


Missiles & Long 
Range Fires on 
Airfields and Ports 


Legend 


Anti-Access 

strategy 


orgia 


Azerbaija 


Armenia 




Objective Force Assured 



Concepts 


Avoid anti-access targeting strategy by: 


Reducing reliance on airfields and ports. Airland first division 
Task Force 


Conducting dispersed entry in unimproved area 

Adjusting entry points en route to permissive and semi- 
permissive areas 


•: 


rganization 


Neutralizing air defense and missile attack at point of entry 
Rapid operationa^^^^^yer upon entry 


Organizational autonomy at 
the lowest level 



Define 
Objective Force 


I I I I J 



Capabilities 


En route remote control of 
ground and air sensors 


Organic full-spectrum design 

Logistic and sustainment 
mobility 

Organic multi-dimensional 
intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance 

Embedded Special Forces 
coordination element for 
situational awareness and 
point of entrv securitv 


* Tactical aircraft with 
strategic legs not 
dependent upon airfields 
that deliver a highly mobile 
force that can fight upon 
entry 

* Localized short range 
missile defense 

* Suppress short range air 
defense 


43 


Dilemma - Entry 
Operations 



Entry Operations Task / 
Purpose 

Rapidly stabilize AOR to set conditions 
for decisive operations: 

• Expand lodgment to assure access / freedom 
of action 

• Establish safe haven for Azeri government 
and populace 

• Establish coalition land forces in Azerbaijan 
and Georgia to display US resolve and 
commitment 

• Deter Iranian aggression 

• Protect lodgments from TBM strikes 



Entry Operations - Today - 

(Under Ideal Conditions) 


s Linear battlespace 
s Mature Infrastructure 
s Secure Staging Base 
^ Contracting options for 
supplies 

s Long standing coalition / 
alliance 

s Over 75 days for 5+ Divisions 



Pure light Infantry 
Lack lethality, mobility, 
survivability and staying 
'power 




orces 


s Enormous logistics 
footprint 

s Reliant on PREPO stocks 
s Not easily deployable 



s Deep water ports 
s Time required for 
reception, staging, 
onward movement and 
integration into gaining 
commands 




CONOPS Comparison - 


General purpose 
forces for offense, 
defense, stability 
and support 
operations in any 

terrain required 

• tstaonsn coalition la'nd 
forces 


AOR 


Link up with Azeri forces 


* Dynamic defense with 
offensive 


stop aggression 


LUty to 




Armenian 

aggression 


Vertical insertion 
of mounted forces 


Employ credible baseline force 

• Establish links to Joint sensors/ 
Comms 

• Establish control of forces tailored to 
mission need 

• SASO in Baku 

• Secure air /(^Y^orts for follow-on 


forces 


* 


f 




1 Division 
120 Hour 



Multiple, 

simultaneous entry 
points 

Not tethered to 
impr oved air and sea 


Directly deter 
Iranian 


annroccinn 



Caspian 


ea 








How Objective Force is Decisive 
in Stability and Support 
Operations 

• Stabilize crisis in Azerbaijan and commence support 
operations undertime sensitive pressures 

• Deter aggression immediately 

• Counter insurgency with effective internal defense 
program 

• Demonstrate ability to protect population and oilfields 

• Stabilize the government in Baku 

• Gain confidence of population and international support 

• Establish coalition land forces 


Today - only uniquely-trained and task organized forces can accom 
Tomorrow - any Objective Force unit can accomplish on call 



Objective Force Entry 
Operations 


Concepts 


* Simultaneous 
operations 

* Distributed 
operations 



* Flexible organizations that 
can quickly tailor to mission 
needs 

* General purpose forces with 
special purpose capabilities 

* Combined arms air-ground 
Task Forces 


* Precision strike 

* Army long range fires to 
shape / shield the force 

* Integrated sensors 

* Army aviation (Recon / Attack / 
Lift) 

* Vertical maneuver of mounted 
forces 

* Theater Ballistic Missiles 

* Mine / counter mine 

* Counter-insuraencv 





Entry Operations Endstate 


•Baku and oilfields secured 
•Armenian advance contained and isolated 
•Precision strike capability in place 
•Iran deterred 

•Azerbaijani government stabilized and in 
power 

•Shielded, assured access for follow-on forces 
•Coalition land forces established 



50 


Dilemma - Decisive 

Operations 



Decisive Operations Dilemma 

Define " DECISIVENESS " 

•Ability to accomplish strategic goals and 
objectives 

•Decision is achieved by: 

^The ability to force an enemy to succumb 
to our will and cease to resist 
^Physically destroying enemy's capability 
to fight 

^Breaking enemy's will by: 

> Inflicting more destruction and 
disintegration of control than the enemy 
can bear 

> Forcing capitulation to negotiate 



Decisive Operations: 

Task / Purpose 

• Conduct counter-offensive to repel 
Armenian forces 

• Restore territorial sovereignty of Azerbaija 

• Eliminate counter-insurgency 

• Resolve conflict in terms favorable for 
peace enforcement 

• Destroy long range precision strike threat 
(deny sanctuary to Armenian forces) 

• Respond to Iranian brinksmanship 



Decisive Operations 



Georgia 


Armenian 

aggression 




— u^r 1 




ft 




Insurgent 

Areas 


* Reconnaissance 

* Snipers 

* Raids 

* Ambushes 

* Terrorists Active 

* Incite riots 






A h " 1 ‘ 

Azerbaijan 




Current Situation 


* Azerbaijan government 
stabilized 

; * CINC has seized initiative 

* Armenians transitioning to 
defense to preserve gains 

* Iran deterred thus far 

* Deterrence force in position 


TBMs 


Iranian forces 
postured to 
invade 







— , 


Decisive Operations 



BMs 


Why we carTt do this today 

* Can't deploy 5 divisions through limited ports 

* Can't logistically sustain 

* Attacks on single axis 

* Fighting units optimized for sequential 
operations: 

s Plan 
s Prepare 
s Attack 
s Pursue 
^ Exploit 
s Plan 


££k‘/-. S C 


Cannot alter 
conditions 


* Cannot enter 
w/ credible 
force 


COUNTER 

INSURGENCY 




aijan 


DETER 

ONTAIN 


. . ' DETER 


Iran 


FORCE RATIO 


1: 1.5 




p . 


-- J 






■ 


Single axis 
Terrain & enemy call 
for light forces which 
lack combat power 


jtu _ 1 ir > v 


J 


FORCE RATIO 
1: 1.5 

TRADITIONAL BATTLE CALCULUS SAYS 
WE NEED 3 OR 6: 1 







equir 


Corps 

Task 

forces 


cour 

INSU 


aijan 


Corps TF 
HQ 


Decisive Operations 


For CINC to get closure, his force must simultaneously: 

* Attack on 2 fronts and be prepared to fight on 3 rd 

s Attack key Armenian forces and decisive points throughout 
area 

^ Continue stabilizing capital area 

^ Continue counterinsurgency operations 

^ Have operational flexibility to counter Iranian intervention 

qia Ti 


Corps TF ^ 

hq 


NCY 


w® > 


id p^PP 


.- 4^1 




rft t j/ "jP-. jH 






Iran 


TAN 




>1 




CONTAIN 


Lodgment 




-i 7\ Air* *F[ 

AGGREGATE FORCE RATIO 

i 1: 1.5 

AGGREGATE FORCE RATIO 

TRADITIONAL BATTLE CALCULUS SAYS 

1: 1.5 

WE NEED 3 OR 6: 1 

Through shaping and Dominant Maneuver * 

CORPS of 2001 CANNOT DO THIS 

generates up to 9:1 at point of decision 


"■■■ ^ ■ ... 







Dominant Maneuver 



1. Develop situation out of contact at tactical standoff 

2. Conduct fires on objective at tactical standoff 

3. Maneuver to position of advantage out of contact 

4. Combine maneuver and fires simultaneously employing 
tactical standoff. Isolate objective 

5. Continue adjustment to changing situation during 
engagement seeking advantage through combined 
arms maneuver 

6. Conduct tactical assault against enemy forces to finish 

j i — 


Why Corps And Divisions 
In The Objective Force 



CORPS 


The Corps links ground forces and 
fight to joint assets and campaign 


Combined Arms 
Air-Ground 
ivision Task Fore 


l 


Combined Arms 
FCS Maneuver 
Brigade 


• Principal means for corps 
executing dominant maneuver in 
decisive operations 

Provides tactical direction to brigades 
^ Provides access to Joint, long range 
fires and aviation fires 

'Principal Unit of Action 

^ Principal formation for closing with 
and destroying enemy 
Habitually organized, cohesive teams 





58 


Dilemma - Sustainment 



Dilemma - Sustainment 


Task / Purpose: Build and sustain 
decisive combat power in austere, 
complex environment 



Objective Force 



150 km 




OBJ 



Refuel / resupply 
On the move 


OBJ 



Non-contiguous 

expanded 

battlespace 

Vulnerable Lines 
of 

Communication 

Base clusters for 
security 

Situational 
awareness allows 
agile resupply 







What's Different 


• Large stockage of repair 
parts (1235 Lines) 

• Recovery: Dedicated assets 

• Scheduled resupply at least 
daily 

• Significant combat service 
support requirements 


• Log Demand 528 Short Tons 

• Log operations planning 
centric / reactive 

• Commonality (# of major 
systems): 13+ 

• Ready-To-Fight: Requires 
RSOI 


7 

■ 


~ OBJECTIVE^ 
k FORCE A 


Less than 400 lines 

Self / Like vehicle recovery 
Every other day or as needed 

Limited combat service support 
requirements thru ultra-reliability, 
commonality, and fuel efficiency 

180 short tons 

Execution centric / anticipatory 

Commonality (# of major 
systems): 5+ 

Fights Off-the-Ramp: Minimal RSO 


n 


Science and 
Technology 



Objective Force Pursuit of 
Technoloov 

Focus of Science and Technology Efforts: 

• Survivability : Integrated approach and denial of shot 
opportunity to the enemy 

• Lethality: Rapidly responsive and accurate effects with 
direct sensor to shooter links across an effects network 
(NET Fires) 

• Power and Energy: Alternative and ultra efficient power 
sources and fuel usage - Includes multi-functional power 
for FCS, directed energy weapons, and soldier power 
systems (batteries) 

• Responsiveness: Ability to deploy rapidly and support 
operations from austere forward areas 

• Soldier and Leader: Improved training and cognitive 
intelligence tools. Enhance stamina and performance 


Objective Force Pursuit of 
Technoloov 

• Integrated Sensors: Sensor packages to provide all- 
seeing capability of enemy to enhance tactical 
standoff fires, maneuver and assault 

• Communications: Reliable non-line-of-sight voice and 
digital communications. Includes requirement for full 
communications during aviation precision strikes 

• Other Kev Areas Include: 

s Extend tactical reach of fires 
Mine / counter mine technology 

^ Intra theater Air Mobile operations 

Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle technologies and 
linkages between manned and unmanned platforms 

^ Logistics demand reduction (ammo, fuel, repair parts, 
and consumption) 



Pursuit of Technology - Lethality 


Objective Force NET Fires in Support of 
Maneuver 




• 300 lb payload 

• > 2500 NM Range 

• 24 hour loiter time 

• Integrated sensors / communications pac 


RF Tagging 

"Passive" location and status repo| 
Reduced bandwidth requirement 
Reduced detectability 
• No power requirement 


NET F res 


Indirect fires capability 

Modular multi-mission precision munitions 

Platform interdependent .... Manned / unm 


r 1 

• Instant clearance of fires 

• Direct sensor to shooter linkage 

• Enhanced BLUEFOR COP & increased lethc 



Pursuit of Technology - Survivability 






Active 
Protection 
System 
(APS) 


Mine 

Detection & 
Neutralization 


Kill The Enemy 
First 
(See- 

Understand-Act 

- F M> 

Don't 
Be ... 


Robotics 


Advanced 
Armo 


Smart Armor 

s Sensor 
^EM Armor 
^Enhance 
Ceramic 


lectromagnetic 

Armor 


Situational 

Understanding 

s See First 
s Understand First 
s Act First 
^ Finish Decisively 




ANODE (I 


Pursuit of Technology - Power & 


Lithium Ion / Polymer 
High Energy Density 
Zinc Air Packs 


Fuel Cells 


Pulse Power 

s Capacitors 
^ Fly Wheels 
^ Inductors 


Silicon Carbon switcl^es^^^ 

Li Ion Batteries 

Multi-MJ Flywheel 

High Density Capacitors 

High Power AC Induction Motors 








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Today's Technologies To Be 
Carried 


Forward To The Objec RA y06F€omaBche 


Raptor 
ntelligent 
Combat 
Outpost 


Raptor will be comprised of 
acoustic overwatch 
sensors, an artificial 
intelligence platform (the 
gateway), and a ground 
control station, and lethad 
or non-lethal muf^t^,rk. BAND 



Ku-BAND 


MILSTAR 


WIN - T 


The Warfighter Information 
Network - Tactical (WIN-T) is 
mobile, secure, survivable, and 
seamless C4ISR capable of 
supporting multimedia tactical 
information systems. 



Comanche provides leth 
survivable, manned air 
reconnaissance for the 


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Objective Force 


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Army ARFOR / EECP 





Today's Technologies To Be 
Carried 

Forward To The Obj££*iM8i<!i AsadS System 


Shadow Tactical UAV 



Shadow 200 TUAV will provide 
U S Army brigade 
commanders with crucial 
reconnaissance, surveillance, 
and battlefield damage 
intelligence — delivered 
efficiently from the air 
vehicle's electronic payload, 
directly to tactical command 
centers. 



JTRS is a family of affordable, high- 
capacity tactical radios to provide both 
line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight C4I 
covering an operating spectrum from 2 
to 2000 MHz. JTRS will be capable of 
transmitting voice, video and data. JTRS 
will not be one radio but rather a family 
of radios that are interoperable, 
affordable and scaleable. 



Summary 



Strategic Benefits of Objective 


•Revolutionary step forward in achieving 
decisive US responsiveness 
•Directly counters emerging anti-access threats 
and strategies 

•Powerful force dominates across spectrum: 
Offense, Defense, Stability and Support. 
•Greatly enhances US strategic agility — 
Provides key to crisis response and 
deterrence 

Decisive around the globe, deploys and 
fights anywhere 

Demonstrates real commitment to allies 
and adversaries 



Conclusion 


• US must maintain global responsiveness to 
remain strategically dominant 

• Current US power projection and decisive 
strategies heavily threatened by time, 
challenges to access, and changing environment 

• Objective Force meets these challenges by 
giving CINCs ability to insert decisive ground 
power throughout Spectrum of Conflict 

^Entry Operations 
Decisive Operations 

• Objective Force solves dilemma of trading 
lethality & decisiveness for deployability and 
responsiveness 

• Objective Force is essential, affordable, near- 

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